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Chapter 7: EU Competition Law and Organisational Rules 
 
Katarina Pijetlovic* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between EU competition law and organisational (regulatory) rules in sport was 
originally formed in 1970s in the Walrave and Donà cases decided under free movement law. 
Therein, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) famously held that sport is subject 
to EU law ‘only in so far as it constitutes economic activity […]’.1 This has been reiterated by 
the Court on several occasions later on, most notably in Bosman, Deliège and Lehtonen.2 The 
required economic effect referred to in these cases presents a generally applicable jurisdictional 
threshold on the competences of EU institutions to act, as well as a constitutional limitation 
regarding the applicability of EU competition law. Apart from certain rules of the game (lex 
ludica)3 and sport as a purely amateur pursuit, it is hard to imagine a rule passed by sport 
governing bodies that is completely devoid of economic effect in practice. All sporting rules 
and practices that do produce required economic effect may become subject to a compatibility 
analysis under the Treaty, including its competition articles. 
 
Regardless of the constitutional competence to decide on the application of the competition 
articles to organisational rules in the sports sector, in Bosman and Deliège the Court avoided 
any discussion on the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to sporting rules that produce 
economic effect. The two cases were decided exclusively under internal market provisions. 
Advocate Generals (AGs), however, did not leave us completely empty handed and both 
addressed this issue in their respective Opinions. Whereas AG Lenz in Bosman focused 
exclusively on weighing pro and anti-competitive features of the restrictive clauses and utilised 
an emerging commercial ancillarity as a method for a compatibility assessment, AG Cosmas in 
Deliège alluded to the possibility of using certain non-economic interests as a justification for 
the rules that restrict competition. 
 
Three years after AG Cosmas’ Opinion, the CJEU in Wouters4 accepted purely non-economic 
public interest justifications under Article 101(1) TFEU for agreements restrictive of the 
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freedom of action. This case introduced the so-called regulatory ancillarity in the application of 
competition law and paved the way for the seminal judgement in Meca-Medina,5 which to date 
remains the only case on the organisational rules in sport decided by the Court under the EU 
antitrust provisions. 
Prior to the passage of the Court’s judgement in Meca-Medina a lot of uncertainty still 
surrounded the application of EU competition law to legal issues involving organisational rules 
of sport. Meca-Medina not only enhanced legal certainty, but also provided a modified 
analytical framework for such rules and practices by adopting the Wouters test in its entirety. It 
is therefore important to distinguish organisational rules from the rules intended to regulate 
revenue-producing activities of the sporting bodies. The former involves activities on the 
market in which clubs and federations exploit their performances and commercial rights 
through, for instance, the sale of tickets and media rights for sports events, merchandising, as 
well as via activities on the supply market for buying and selling of players. Examples of 
organisational rules, on the other hand, include rules of the game, rules concerning selection 
criteria for sports competitions, ‘at home and away from home’ rules, rules preventing multiple 
ownership in club competitions, rules concerning the composition of national teams, anti-
doping rules and rules concerning transfer windows.  
In 2007 the EU Commission published the White Paper on Sport accompanied by a 
Commission Staff Working Document.6 It summarised the EU competition law approach to the 
sports sector and provided examples of organisational rules in sport that are likely to infringe, 
as well as organisational rules likely not to infringe the competition provisions.  
However, as emphasised by both the Court in Meca-Medina and by the Commission in the 
White Paper on Sport, there can be no automatic exclusion of any organisational sporting rule 
that produces economic effect from the scope of the Treaty. Their compatibility with EU 
competition provisions can only be made on a case-by-case basis within the analytical 
framework provided by Annex I of the Commission Staff Working Document that, among 
others, includes the Meca-Medina test. This contextual approach to regulatory rules is further 
complemented by the notion of the specificity of sport, included in Article 165(1) TFEU by the 
Lisbon Treaty amendments that entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
This article states that ‘[t]he Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting 
issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary 
activity and its social and educational function’ [emphasis added]. Prior to the passage of the 
Lisbon Treaty amendments, the sport-related public interest based on the specificity of the 
industry and its social and educational function was already taken into consideration and 
accepted by both the Court and the Commission in many internal market cases. This is 
significant for competition law as well due to the high level of convergence with the free 
movement area7 and virtually uniform compatibility tests for organisational rules in sport.  
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Against this general background, this chapter explains the evolution of the law and policy 
concerning the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to organisational rules in the sport 
sector. 
 
2. Sporting rules in internal market jurisprudence 
 
2.1 Purely sporting rules: Walrave [1974] and Donà [1976] 
 
Apart from sporting rules that do not constitute an economic activity and therefore do not fall 
within the scope of the Treaty according to paragraph 4 of Walrave, the CJEU set out the test 
for the so-called purely sporting rules. In paragraph 8 of Walrave it made an exception for a 
directly discriminatory sporting rule on selection of athletes for national representative teams. 
Specifically, with regard to discrimination based on nationality as prohibited under Articles 18, 
45 and 56 TFEU, the Court stated that such prohibition ‘does not affect the composition of sport 
teams, in particular national teams, the formation of which is a question of purely sporting 
interest and as such has nothing to do with economic activity.’8 It further added in paragraph 9 
that ‘this restriction on the scope of the provisions in question must however remain limited to 
its proper objective.’ Accordingly, the Treaty would not apply to economic sporting activities 
as long as the motive for the proportionate rules was non-economic, or in other words, ‘purely 
sporting’. 
Two years later in Donà9 a football agent challenged the strict nationality and residence 
preconditions for participation in all non-amateur matches imposed by the Italian Football 
Federation. The challenged rules limited the right to participate in matches (as professional or 
semi-professional players) almost exclusively to Italian nationals. In paragraph 14 of Donà, the 
Court modified and restricted the rule in paragraph 8 of Walrave. The exception to prohibition 
on direct discrimination for the composition of national teams was reformulated and substituted 
with the exclusion of foreign players ‘from participation in certain matches for the reasons 
which are not of an economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such 
matches and are thus of sporting interest only’. Matches between national teams were 
mentioned only as an example of the kind of exclusion of players that fall under this category 
of sporting exception. 
As acknowledged by AG Lenz in Bosman, Donà represents a limitation on paragraph 8 in 
Walrave. The Court rightly did not make a reference to that paragraph because it was aware 
that the question of the composition of sport teams may well be dominated by non-sporting 
motives. AG Lenz concluded that neither the basis nor the extent of the ‘exception’ can be 
deduced with certainty from these two judgments.10 
Purely sporting rules are therefore the rules that are exempted, since they: (1) produce the 
required economic effect, (2) are based on non-economic, purely sporting motives, (3) relate to 
the particular nature and context of certain matches, and (4) are proportionate. According to 
some authors, the ‘purely sporting’ rules exception ‘does not apply to sports teams, or to general 
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rules on team composition, but only to nationality rules in national team sports’.11 It is indeed 
difficult to think of any other rule that would in practice align with the strict demands of this 
exception. However, as a matter of legal and judicial construction, such possibility exists and 
the Court has been citing this exception in its other judgments outside the context of nationality 
discrimination.12 
 
2.2 Objectively justified rules: Bosman [1995], Lehtonen [2000], and Bernard [2010] 
 
Unlike purely sporting and inherent rules (discussed below), objectively justified rules in sport 
constitute restrictions under internal market law. Such restrictions can, however, be justified 
under the generally applicable objective justification framework as set out in Kraus and 
Gebhard.13 Accordingly, those rules that (1) pursued a legitimate aim compatible with the 
Treaty and were justified by pressing reasons of public interest, and (2) are compatible with the 
principle of proportionality do not breach the provisions on free movement of persons.14 
Importantly, the assessment of sporting rules under the Gebhard-style framework involves a 
sensitive application of EU law to sport,15 and the recognition of the specificity of the sports 
industry. Unlike in ordinary cases, in sport cases the Court uses an alteration of the test for both 
directly and indirectly discriminatory rules.16 The Court was asked to consider the legality of 
organisational rules in sports under Article 45 TFEU in Bosman, Lehtonen, and Bernard.17  
 
The facts of the Bosman case are well-known; it involved a directly discriminatory ‘3+2’ rule 
passed by Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) that placed quota on clubs in 
fielding foreign players and non-discriminatory transfer fee rules which restricted the 
professional activities of football players. With regard to the latter, in view of the considerable 
social importance of football in the EU, the Court acknowledged encouraging the recruitment 
and training of young players and maintaining the competitive balance between clubs as 
legitimate objectives.18 Conversely, it brushed aside the attempts to justify quotas on the basis 
of their alleged necessity to maintain the traditional link between each club and their country, 
to create a sufficient pool of top national players to be fielded in national representative team, 
and to maintain competitive balance between clubs. The fact that the quota rule was drawn up 
in collaboration with the Commission did not shield it from judicial scrutiny or provide any 
guarantees as to its compatibility with the Treaty, as the Commission does not have the power 
to authorise rules and practices contrary to the Treaty. Quotas were abolished by the Court, 
whereas the transfer fees for the expired contracts were found unsuitable for the attainment of 
the said objectives and also failed the proportionality test.  
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The Court considered that in the light of its answers under Article 45 TFEU, it was unnecessary 
to address the questions on interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU that were also referred 
to it for a preliminary ruling. However, AG Lenz in Bosman, entertained the arguments of the 
respondent that referred to the ‘rule of reason’, a concept applied in the US under Article 1 of 
the Sherman Act. While he acknowledged that Europe does not have the ‘rule of reason’ 
doctrine and instead uses Article 101(3) TFEU as a platform for exemption analysis, he 
nevertheless found a functional equivalent that existed at the time in the form of the DLG case19 
on commercial ancillarity, a precursor to Wouters case that contained the same basic approach 
to assessment of legality of restrictions as the core competition test applied to sporting rules 
today.20  
 
In Lehtonen, the transfer of a basketball player did not take place within the specified time 
period, i.e. within the so-called ‘transfer window’ passed by the International Basketball 
Federation. A player that was not employed within the specified period could not play for his 
team in competitions for that season. Citing Bosman, the Court reiterated in paragraph 50 of 
Lehtonen that being fielded is the ‘essential purpose of a professional player’s activity’ and the 
rules prohibiting fielding restrict the chances of being employed. Because they affected labour 
market access as opposed to the exercise of economic activity, transfer windows were not 
inherent rules, but instead restrictions to free movement that fell to be examined under the 
objective justification framework.21 The Court found them justified on non-economic grounds, 
namely the need for proper organisation of the game because mid-season transfers could 
substantially alter the sporting strength and, therefore, the competition between teams in the 
course of a championship.22 Nevertheless, transfer windows in this particular case were found 
to be disproportionate and in breach of Article 45 of the Treaty because they were opened 
substantially longer for the players from outside the EU.23 The instruction from Annex I of the 
Commission Staff Working Document is that, had the transfer periods in Lehtonen been 
proportionate, they would have been justified not only under free movement law, but also under 
Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU.24 Objectively justified sporting rules under internal market law 
satisfy the inherency test under competition law and vice-versa.25 
The questions on the interpretation of EU competition law provisions were considered 
inadmissible due to the insufficient factual information provided by the referring national court. 
Similarly to AG Lenz in Bosman, AG Alber in Lehtonen considered the rule prima facie 
restrictive, but adopted the reasoning from DLG to support the reasoning that necessary and 
proportionate rules may be saved from being labelled as restrictions.26  
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In Bernard, a trainee footballer was required to pay damages for the loss suffered by the club 
that trained him as a method of compensation for signing his first professional contract with 
another club and, consequently, breaching his contractual obligations. The Court utilised the 
obstacle approach to find that the compensation scheme in Bernard, while constituting neither 
a prohibition on signing a contract with a club in another Member State nor discrimination on 
the basis of nationality, nevertheless discourages the player from exercising his right of free 
movement by making it less attractive.27 Referring to the Bosman case by taking into account 
the considerable social importance of sporting activities, in particular football, in the EU, the 
Court accepted the objective of encouraging recruitment and training of young players as 
legitimate.28 The social importance of sport played a crucial role in legitimating this objective 
and it would probably not be accepted as such in (m)any other employment sectors. Unlike in 
Bosman, the compensation fees in Bernard were deemed capable of attaining the said 
objective.29 Thereafter, the Court referred for the first time to Article 165(1) TFEU; it set out 
the standard of application of the proportionality principle in the objective justification 
framework, according to which account must be taken of the specific characteristics of sport 
and its social and educational function.30 The same standard of application of proportionality 
test, it is submitted, applies in the interpretation and application of EU competition law to sport.  
 
2.3 Inherent rules: Deliège [2000] 
 
The concept of inherent rules originated in Deliège where the Court was asked to determine the 
compatibility with Article 56 (and Articles 101 and 102) TFEU of selection rules of the 
governing body for judo in Belgium limiting the number of participants in the high-level 
international competitions that do not involve national teams competing against each other. The 
question forwarded to the CJEU by the Tribunal de Première de Namur was whether it was 
contrary to those articles to ‘require professional or semi-professional athletes, or persons 
aspiring to professional or semi-professional activity, to be authorised by their federation in 
order to be able to compete in international competition which does not involve national teams 
competing against each other’.31 
The Court first dismissed the applicability of the purely sporting rule exception and recognised 
that unlike in Bosman the rules challenged in Deliège ‘do not determine the conditions 
governing access to the labour market by professional sportsmen and do not contain nationality 
clauses limiting the number of nationals of other Member States who may participate in a 
competition’.32 The selection rules at issue in the main proceedings were, therefore, considered 
as non-discriminatory rules affecting the exercise of an economic activity rather than 
discriminatory market access rules.33 The Court proceeded to specify that the challenged rules 
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could not in themselves constitute an obstacle on the freedom to provide services under Article 
56 TFEU because limiting the number of participants ‘is inherent in the conduct of an 
international high-level sports event, which necessarily involves certain selection rules or 
criteria being adopted’.34 The sport organisations must further be able to demonstrate that 
selection rules are based on objective criteria independent from the personal circumstances of 
the athletes.35 
Although the Court did not explicitly mention that the inherent rules should be proportionate, 
such requirement follows from paragraph 65 of the judgment: 
[…] the adoption, for the purposes of an international sports tournament, of one system 
for selecting participants rather than another must be based on a large number of 
considerations unconnected with the personal situation of any athlete, such as the nature, 
the organisation and the financing of the sport concerned. 
Accordingly, the discriminatory rule would be considered disproportionate and would fail the 
inherency test. The preference of one system over another is left to sporting bodies and 
organisers36 as long as the selection is made on the basis of objective factors unconnected with 
the athletes’ personal situation. The proportionality of such a system is not questioned by the 
Court as it is deemed proportionate by default.  
Only non-discriminatory rules that do not relate to market access can satisfy the inherency test 
under the free movement provisions.37 Therefore, the inherent rules exception includes rules 
that, based on legitimate objectives,38 do not constitute restrictions because they derive from 
the need, and their restrictive effects are, inherent in the organisation of sport, and are 
proportionate. The Commission in its Communication on Sport did not differentiate between 
competition and internal market law when it examined the compatibility of sporting rules with 
any EU law against the inherency and proportionality tests.39 
The questions on the interpretation of EU competition law provisions in Deliège were similar 
to those expressed in Lehtonen in claiming them inadmissible due to insufficient factual 
information provided by the referring national court. AG Cosmas in Deliège referred to and 
followed the approach of AG Lenz in Bosman.40 
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2.4 Final remarks 
 
The distinctions made in internal market cases between purely sporting, inherent, and 
objectively justified rules do not apply in the analytical structure of competition law to 
organisational rules in sport. It is submitted that the different types of sporting rules identified 
in internal market law cases should all be dealt with under a single objective justification test, 
since it is able to accommodate every type of organisational rule and yet produce the same 
result. This would also bring clarity in cases where a legal claim is raised under both internal 
market and competition provisions of the Treaty. This judicial route naturally stems from the 
analytical framework provided by the Meca-Medina/Wouters test, discussed below in Section 
7, which mirrors the objective justification test under internal market law.  
 
3. Applicability of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in the sporting sector 
 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU provide a primary tool to control behaviour by undertakings that 
produce anti-competitive effects. The underlying objectives of these articles are of economic 
nature and include protecting undistorted competition on the market, achieving optimal 
allocation of resources, increasing consumer welfare and aiding in creation of the European 
internal market.41 During the various stages of integration the EU increasingly moved from a 
purely economic constitution designed for a market-oriented system to a constitutional model 
inclusive of wider socio-cultural concerns. This is reflected in both the application of EU 
competition articles by the EU institutions as well as in the development of EU sports law and 
policy. The application of antitrust law to organisational rules in the sporting sector inevitably 
raises questions on the interrelationship and balance between economic and social dimensions 
of the Union’s policy and can become a relatively complex issue. 
 
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices, which are considered capable of affecting trade between 
Member States and that have as their object (i.e., subjectively intend) or effect (i.e., objectively 
cause)42 the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the internal market. 
Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of market power by undertakings in a dominant position 
in one or more relevant markets. The thrust of this policy is not to prohibit the acquisition and 
existence of power per se, but is directed at controlling the unilateral behaviour of a dominant 
firm(s). In essence, three related enquiries must be conducted when determining the existence 
of an abuse of a dominant position,43 namely relevant market determination, dominance on the 
relevant market and establishing the abuse of that dominant position.  
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C 101/81. 
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Commission [1978] ERC 207, para 65. 
  
According to settled case law, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are not mutually exclusive, but may 
be applied simultaneously.44 Already in its early judgment of Continental Can the CJEU held 
that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU seek to attain the same aim of maintaining effective 
competition within the common market.45 The agreements between two or more undertakings 
containing restrictive clauses might create or reinforce a position of dominance which is, or 
may become, subject to abuse. Such agreements may be deemed incompatible with both Article 
101 and 102 TFEU. 
 
It has been recognised that national and international sporting associations, clubs and 
independent athletes can constitute ‘undertakings’.46 Sporting federations can, in addition, also 
constitute an ‘association of undertakings’47 or an ‘association of associations of 
undertakings’.48 Their rules can amount to ‘agreements or decisions,’49 distort competition 
within the relevant market and affect trade between Member States within the meaning of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.50 Article 102 TFEU does not include the concept of ‘association 
of undertakings’, but applies to unilateral conduct of one or more dominant ‘undertakings’. The 
General Court has held that even where a sports federation, such as FIFA, is not active on a 
particular market, it may be considered an ‘undertaking’ under Article 102 TFEU to the extent 
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 See Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECR 461, para 116; Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and 
Silver Line Reisebüro GmbH v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V. [1989] ECR 803, para 37; 
Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA, Compagnie Maritime 
Belge SA and Dafra-Lines A/S v Commission [2000] ECR I-1365, para 33. 
45 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commission [1973] ECR 215, 
para 11; See also Case T-51/89 Tetra Pack Rausing SA v. Commission [1990] ECR II-309, para 22. 
46
 For national and international sporting associations as undertakings see Case T-193/02 Laurent Piau v. 
Commission [2005] ECR II-0209, paras 69–72; Commission Decision in COMP IV/37.806 — ENIC/UEFA, 
unpublished decision of 27 June 2002, para 25; Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Bosman, points 255 et 
seq; Commission Decision in Cases 33.384 and 33.378 — Distribution of package tours during the 1990 World 
Cup [1992] OJ L 326/31, paras 47 and 52-53. For individual athletes as undertakings see Deliège, paras 56-57. 
According to AG Lenz in Bosman, para 263, football players employed by a football club do not constitute 
undertakings, as they are workers and not providers of services. Commission Staff Working Document, The EU 
and Sport: Background and Context, Accompanying Document to the White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391 
final, Annex I, para 2.1.3 clarifies that ‘even if athletes are employed by a sport club, they may be considered 
undertakings insofar as they carry out economic activities independent thereof, e.g., by entering into sponsoring 
agreements’. 
47
 See Piau, paras 69-72, where the General Court held that ‘69. […] FIFA’s members are national associations, 
which are groupings of football clubs for which the practice of football is an economic activity. These football 
clubs are therefore undertakings within the meaning of Article [101 TFEU] and the national associations 
grouping them together are associations of undertakings within the meaning of that provision. 70. The fact that 
the national associations are groupings of ‘amateur’ clubs, alongside ‘professional’ clubs, is not capable of 
calling that assessment into question.[…] 72. Since the national associations constitute associations of 
undertakings and also, by virtue of the economic activities that they pursue, undertakings, FIFA, an association 
grouping together national associations, also constitutes an association of undertakings within the meaning of 
Article [101 TFEU].’ See also Opinion of AG Lenz in Bosman, paras 255–257; Commission Decision in Case 
COMP/C.2-37.398 – Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League [2003] OJ L 
291/25.  
48 UEFA Champions League, para 106. 
49 Piau, para 75. Rules drawn up unilaterally by sporting associations consisting of undertakings will usually 
constitute decisions by an association of undertakings (see ENIC/UEFA, para 26, for a rule drawn up by the 
UEFA Executive Committee, and Meca-Medina, para 45 for a rule drawn up by the International Olympic 
Committee and implemented by the International Swimming Federation). 
50 For general guidance see European Commission, Guidelines on the effect of trade concept contained in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/7.  
  
that it represents the emanation of its members that are active on that market.51 Furthermore, 
when they directly engage in an economic activity, sporting federations usually acquire a status 
of an undertaking in a monopolistic position,52 whereas clubs organised in a league may be held 
collectively dominant within the meaning of Article 102 as interpreted by the relevant case 
law.53 Rules adopted by international sporting organisations would normally affect trade 
between Member States due to their scope of application. Additionally, rules of national sports 
associations usually affect only the territory of their respective country, but in the light of the 
high degree of internationalisation and mobility in professional sport, those rules may also 
affect trade between Member States.54 
 
The scope of Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU is very broad since no actual and direct effect on 
trade is required and prima facie any agreement and any abuse of a dominant position may be 
covered by these provisions. However, there are a number of exceptions available. Two 
exceptions that are of particular importance for the topic of this chapter are the economic 
efficiency defence and the judicially developed ancillary restraints doctrine. 
 
4. Exceptions under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
 
4.1 Economic efficiency defence under Articles 101(3) and 102 TFEU 
 
Agreements, decisions or practices that are incompatible with Article 101(1), but satisfy the 
conditions under Article 101(3) of the Treaty, are valid and enforceable with no prior decision 
to that effect being required.55 The rationale behind this provision is that certain agreements 
may have both pro-competitive and anti-competitive features. The dual nature of economic 
effects usually involves complex economic analysis weighting the beneficial and harmful 
effects in order to determine whether the agreement qualifies for the exemption. Accordingly, 
those agreements, decisions or practices that fulfil the four conditions outlined in this provision 
would benefit from an exemption. Two positive conditions state that an agreement must 
improve the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress, and 
at the same time allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits. Two negative conditions 
require that an agreement cannot contain any restrictions that are not essential to the attainment 
of the objectives under agreement (i.e. disproportionate restrictions) and cannot lead to the 
elimination of competition in respect of a substantial part of the product in question. Balancing 
of anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects is conducted exclusively within the framework 
                                                 
51 Piau, paras 112 and 116. 
52 Commission Staff Working Document, Annex I, para 2.1.4 recognises that: ‘sports associations usually have 
practical monopolies in a given sport and may thus normally be considered dominant in the market of the 
organisation of sport events under Article [102] EC.’ 
53 For discussion on the concept of collective dominance in the sporting context see Piau, paras 113-115; AG 
Lenz Opinion in Bosman, para 285.  
54 For more on the application of basic elements of EU competition law in sporting sector, see Commission Staff 
Working Document, Annex I, discussed below in Section 6.  
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1, art 1 (2).  
  
laid down by Article 101(3),56 and there is no scope in this provision for non-competition 
arguments that cannot be translated into economic efficiencies.57 The approach of the EU 
Commission is that under Article 101(3), public policy objectives may be taken into account 
only if they can be subsumed under one of its four conditions,58 so as a supplement to economic 
benefits that the agreement generates.59  
 
A company holding a dominant position may benefit from an exemption under Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty when its conditions are fulfilled.60 In the Piau case decided in the sporting context, 
the General Court held that if the conduct of a dominant company satisfies all the conditions of 
Article 101(3) such conduct should not be classified as an abuse under Article 102 of the 
Treaty.61  
Unlike Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU does not contain an exemption provision. 
However, the Commission outlined in its 2005 Discussion Paper the conditions under which a 
dominant company may also rely on the efficiency defence in cases of abusive exclusionary 
conduct. These conditions, which reproduce the four cumulative criteria of Article 101(3) 
TFEU, were later confirmed in the Commission Guidance reflecting the overall reform and the 
uniform approach towards Article 102 TFEU and shifting the focus from the form-based 
towards a more effects-based analysis.62 By mirroring the cartel exemption provision, the 
efficiency defence amounts to a functional and analytical equivalent of Article 101(3) TFEU in 
the framework of Article 102 TFEU. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 See European Commission, Guidelines on application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97, para 
11; European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1, para 20. See also Case T-65/98 Van 
den Bergh Foods [2003] ECR II-4653, para 107; Case T-112/99 Métropole télévision (M6) and others [2001] 
ECR II-2459, para 74, where the General Court held that it is only in the framework of Article 101(3) that the 
pro- and anti-competitive aspects of a restriction may be weighed. 
57 See also Semmelmann 2008, p 15. The Commission has accepted arguments on the basis of environmental 
protection in Case IV/F 1/36/718 — CECED [2000] OJ L 187/47. In Case 26/76 Metro (I) [1977] ECR 1875, 
para 43, the Court has accepted that ‘the establishment of supply forecasts for a reasonable period constitutes a 
stabilising factor with regard to the provision of employment which, since it improves general conditions of 
production, [...] comes within the framework of the objectives to which reference may be had pursuant to Article 
[101(3)]’. The stabilising effect of an agreement on employment may translate into cost savings and other 
efficiency gains. 
58 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97, para 
42. So far, the other policy objectives have been considered under the first condition. See also Commission 
White Paper on Modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Commission 
Programme No 99/027 1999/OJ C 132/1, which in para 56 states that Article 101 (3) is meant to ‘provide a legal 
framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow the application of the 
competition rules to be set aside because of political considerations’. 
59 See Section 4.2 below.  
60
 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97, pp 
97-118, para 106. 
61 Piau, para 119. 
62 European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, para 30.  
  
4.2 Regulatory ancillarity 
 
Ancillary restraints (restrictions on competition that are directly related and objectively 
necessary for the implementation of the main non-restrictive transaction and are proportionate 
to it) fall outside of the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU.63 The STM, Metro and DLG cases64 
involved ‘commercial ancillarity’ restraints because the restrictions on competition were 
ancillary to a legitimate commercial purpose.65 
The exception that is relevant for organisational rules in sport was introduced by the CJEU in 
Wouters66 and it was characterised by Monti as a ‘European-style rule of reason’67 and by 
Whish, perhaps more accurately, as a ‘regulatory ancillarity’.68 The judgment does not really 
introduce the rule of reason in Article 101(1) because balancing of the pro- and anti-competitive 
effects of restrictions involves economic arguments on both sides, whereas Wouters introduces 
a balancing between EU competition law objectives and non-economic public interests that do 
not necessarily need to be a part of the Union’s objectives. Accordingly, certain types of 
agreements or decisions that restrict the commercial behaviour of undertakings do not violate 
the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU, if, because of their context and objectives, the 
restrictions in those agreements or decisions are inherent and proportionate to the realisation 
of non-competition objectives.69 In the case law on regulatory ancillarity70 the exception was 
applied only in cases of regulatory restrictions imposed by collective private bodies (and public 
legal persons when engaging in economic activity and not exercising powers which are typical 
of public authority) in the public interest, whether at national, European or global level. The 
Court has so far applied this framework only to rules having a public law character and deemed 
necessary for the proper organisation and ethical conduct of a certain profession. It is submitted 
that these facts do not imply that the framework developed under that case law cannot be used 
to accommodate other kinds of non-competition objectives, in particular those under policy-
linking clauses of the Treaty, the importance of which has been enhanced by the Lisbon 
amendments.71 To allow a reliance on the public interest defence for agreements concluded by 
private parties that do not derive their powers from public laws, especially private collective 
bodies such as the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and UEFA, is 
necessary in an area where no responsible public authority vested with powers to enforce the 
                                                 
63 European Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97, 
paras 28–31; Métropole, para 104.  
64 Case C-56/65 Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (M.B.U.) [1966] ECR 235; 
Case 26/76 Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v Commission of the European Communities [1977] ECR 
1875; Case C-250/92 DLG [1994] ECR I-5641. 
65 As termed by Whish 2009, p 126. 
66 Wouters, para 97. 
67 Monti 2002, pp 1087-1088. 
68 Whish 2009, p 126.  
69 Wouters, para 97; Meca-Medina, para 42. 
70 Wouters, Meca-Medina, Case C-1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência 
(OTOC) [2013], and Case C-136/12 Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v Autorità garante della concorrenza e del 
mercato and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato v Consiglio nazionale dei geologi (CNG) [2013]. 
See also Commission decision in ENIC/UEFA.  
71 Pijetlovic 2015, p 153. The EU for the first time has a duty to mainstream the policy objectives under Article 7 
TFEU after the Lisbon amendments: ‘The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, 
taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers’. 
  
laws protecting those public interests exists.72 It represents a constitutional fine-tuning of the 
Union’s competition law in view of the increase in private governance and self-regulation of 
certain sectors and the corresponding decrease in the private/public divide in EU law. 
It is worth mentioning that in the ENIC case concerning the UEFA rule prohibiting multiple 
ownership of clubs the Commission applied the Wouters test and recognised its necessity. The 
foregoing considerations present one of the reasons why the principle of convergence ought to 
be formally adopted within competition and internal market provisions to the extent possible.73 
The Court has anyhow made some competition decisions on the basis of single market 
considerations, which at that time, due to misunderstandings and lack of any references to 
convergence, attracted a lot of criticism.74 
The framework established by Wouters can accommodate any other policy objectives in 
accordance with Article 7 TFEU and, at the same time, stay faithful to the already established 
and persistently defended paradigms that balancing of anti-competitive and pro-competitive 
effects is conducted exclusively within the framework of Article 101(3) TFEU. Only economic 
efficiencies are to be taken into account in the exemption provision which includes public policy 
objectives that can be translated into an economic efficiency argument.75  
Namely, an agreement or decision that restricts competition, but genuinely pursues a public 
policy objective under some of the policy-linking clauses76 or outside their scope,77 that is not 
protected by a public regulation,78 and that fulfils the Wouters criteria could thus escape the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. Should the outcome of the Wouters test be different, the 
agreement or decision would have to satisfy the four conditions of Article 101(3). If the public 
policy objective that it pursues can be transposed into economic benefits, it should be taken into 
account also in the framework of the exemption provision, although it is likely to fail the 
indispensability requirement in the cases where it already failed to satisfy the proportionality 
under Wouters. This is the true face of the European-style rule of reason and to interpret the 
exemption provision as suitable for purely non-competition arguments would have the effect of 
completely blurring the distinction between the different paragraphs of Article 101.79 
 
Under Article 102 TFEU, the EU Courts and the Commission normally use the concept of 
objective justification coupled with the proportionality test80 instead of the ancillary restraints 
                                                 
72 However, the General Court held that where there is public authority with powers, for example, in relation to 
product safety, it is not for private undertakings to take the initiative to eliminate the products which are not safe. 
See Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, para 118.  
73 Pijetlovic 2015, pp 215-235. 
74 See, for example, discussion on Consten and Grundig, Jones and Sufrin 2011, pp 204–209.  
75 Monti 2002, p 1057 and pp 1090-1091; Faull and Nikpay 2007, para 3.406; Case T-17/98 Matra Hatchette v 
Commission [1994] ECR II-595, para 139; Cases C-403 and 429/08 Premier League LTD v QC Leisure and 
Murphy v Media Protection Services LTD [2011] ECR I-9083.  
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167 (4) TFEU, health protection in Article 168 (1) TFEU, competitiveness of the Union’s industry in Article 173 
(3) TFEU, and regional development under Article 175 TFEU. 
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 See Wouters, Meca-Medina, and Gøttrup-Klim. 
78 Hilti, para 118. 
79 Pijetlovic 2015, p 156. 
80 Case T-65/89 BPB [1993] ECR II-00389, para 94; Hilti, paras 102-119; Case 311/84 Centre Belge d’Etudes du 
Marché-Télémarketing (CBEM) v. CLT SA [1985] ECR 3261, para 26. 
  
doctrine, although both concepts perform exactly the same function. It would appear from the 
decisional practice of the Commission, as well as from the Commission’s Guidance,81 that 
objective justifications may include non-economic objectives and amount to an equivalent of 
public policy justification under Article 101(1) TFEU. A dominant undertaking that engages in 
an abusive, but objectively justified and proportionate conduct will be, as a matter of 
technicality, considered as not having committed an abuse in the first place.82  
It is submitted that the objective justification defence has been replaced by the Wouters test 
when applying Article 102 TFEU to regulatory acts of collective bodies that pursue a public 
policy interest. With regard to organisational rules in sport, this submission is no longer 
debatable. The Commission in its Staff Working Document was unequivocal that Meca-
Medina, that fully embraced Wouters test in regard to Article 101(1) TFEU, provides guidance 
as regards the methodological approach towards assessing a sporting rule under both Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU.83 
 
5. Commission investigation in FIA [2001] and Court’s decision in MOTOE [2008] 
 
A case concerning the conflict of interest between the regulatory and commercial functions of 
a sport association involved the Fédération Internationale d’Automobile (FIA), the 
international association for motor sport. FIA is the organiser and promoter of motor sport 
championships, including Formula One. It issued licences to any party wishing to participate in 
international motor sport events authorised by FIA, including track owners, vehicle 
manufacturers, organisers of motor sport events and drivers. License holders were allowed to 
organise or enter only those events authorised by FIA. Entering or organising events not 
authorised by FIA would lead to the loss of their license and the end of any commercial activity 
in motor sport. This way, FIA was able to exercise control over everyone and everything needed 
to stage a rival championship that could compete with FIA’s events.  
The Commission found evidence that the competing GTR Organisation was forced out of the 
market by FIA’s rules and that the GTR series were replaced by the FIA GT Championship. 
Furthermore, FIA claimed media rights to all events incorporating the FIA name, which were 
then transferred to International Sportsworld Communicators (ISC). In addition, Formula One 
teams were forced by the terms of the tripartite Concorde Agreement to assign all broadcasting 
rights in the Formula One championship to FIA, which were later transferred to Formula One 
Administration Ltd (FOA), a commercial rights holder. The same agreement also prevented 
Formula One teams from racing in any other series comparable to Formula One for a 
considerably long period of time. The promoters’ rights were taken directly by FOA, which had 
been given the power by the FIA to determine who can and cannot be a promoter of a grand 
prix. It is also interesting to note that the vice-president of FIA, Bernie Ecclestone, was in 
control of both FOA and ISC.  
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 European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7. 
82 On the last point see the AG Jacobs Opinion in Case C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & 
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83 Commission Staff Working Document, Annex I, para 2.1.1; Case C-250/92 DLG [1994] ECR I-5641. 
  
An agreement between FOA and a number of broadcasters and promoters involved in the 
Formula One championship was reinforcing the existing hurdles for those who wished to stage 
a series competing with Formula One. The promoters’ contracts prevented circuits used for 
Formula One races from being used for competing races, while the agreements with 
broadcasters placed a massive financial penalty, ranging from between 33% to 50% of the price 
paid, if they televised anything deemed by FOA to be a competitive threat to Formula One.84 
In 1999, the Commission issued a Statement of Objections. It came to the preliminary 
conclusion that the rules described were contrary to Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU as they gave 
FIA control to block the organisation of races that competed with the events FIA promoted or 
organised, in particular Formula One from which it derived the biggest commercial benefit. The 
Commission also objected to certain terms of the contracts between the FOA and broadcasters. 
Finally, the Commission objected to FIA rules according to which FIA automatically acquired 
media rights to all motor sport events, even if they were promoted by a different promoter. The 
core of all of the objections was directed at the conflict between the FIA’s legitimate role as the 
regulator of international motor sport and its commercial interests.85 
 
In 2001 the Commission closed the case after reaching a settlement with FIA’s president Max 
Mosley and the CEO of FOA Bernie Ecclestone. The settlement provided that FIA would: 
limit its role to that of a sport regulator without influence over the commercial 
exploitation of the sport and thus removing any conflict of interest (through the 
appointment by FIA of a ‘commercial rights holder’ for 100 years in exchange for a 
one-off fee); guarantee access to motor sport to any racing organisation and to no longer 
prevent teams to participate in and circuit owners to organize other races provided the 
requisite safety standards are met; waive its TV rights or transfer them to the promoters 
concerned; and remove the anticompetitive clauses from the agreements between FOA 
and broadcasters.86  
Later in 2001, after consultation with all the interested parties, the Commission closed its 
investigation in the FIA case satisfied that the agreed amendments will alleviate competition 
concerns.87 In 2003 it ended its monitoring of FIA’s compliance with the 2001 settlement.88 
 
It is important to compare this case with MOTOE in which the restrictions on competition were 
enabled through the grant of special or exclusive rights by the Greek government. In MOTOE, 
Article 49 of the Greek Road Traffic Code provided that a license to organise motorcycling 
events would be issued to the organisers by the Minister for Public Order or the authorities 
empowered by him only after the organiser secures the consent from the official representative 
of the Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme (the International Motorcycling Federation) 
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in Greece. Accordingly, the power to grant consent for the organisation of motorcycling events 
was given to ELPA (Elliniki Leskhi Aftokinitou kai Periigiseon - Automobile and Touring Club 
of Greece), a legal person and a non-profit association which organized the same kinds of events 
in Greece. MOTOE (Greek Motorcycling Federation) planned to organise a motorcycling 
competition in Greece, but ELPA rejected its application for no objective reason and, therefore, 
failed to obtain authorisation from the competent ministry. Subsequently, MOTOE claimed 
pecuniary damages from the government in the Greek national court relying on Articles 102 
and 106(1) TFEU. Article 49 of the Greeks Road Traffic Code conferred on ELPA a position 
of monopoly power over the organisation of motorcycle events in Greece which as such does 
not breach Article 102 of the Treaty unless that power is being abused. MOTOE claimed that 
ELPA abused its monopolistic position by refusing to grant the consent needed for authorisation 
of its planned event.  
There was no doubt that ELPA was dominant on the markets for the organisation of 
motorcycling events and for their commercial exploitation by means of sponsorship, advertising 
and insurance contracts. Granting special or exclusive rights to an undertaking to control 
whether and under which conditions other undertakings can gain access and engage in activities 
on the relevant market entails such conclusion. ELPA’s monopoly to grant the necessary 
consent was statutory and, therefore, the examination of Article 106 TFEU was needed. The 
classification of ELPA as an undertaking entrusted with the operation of ‘services of general 
economic interests’ for the purposes of Article 106(2) TFEU was dismissed on the following 
ground: the undertaking’s economic activities related to the organisation and commercial 
exploitation of motorcycling events were not conferred by an act of entrustment by the public 
authority, an element needed for the application of this provision. The power to grant consent 
to applications for authorisation to organise motorcycling events, although stemming from an 
act of public authority, could not be classified as an economic activity. Consequently, Article 
106(2) TFEU was held inapplicable to this part of ELPA’s activities.89 
The Court then turned its attention to Article 106(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 102 
TFEU. The mere creation or reinforcement of a dominant position through the grant of special 
or exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 106(1) TFEU was not in itself considered 
incompatible with Article 102 TFEU. However, it held that: 
a Member State will be in breach of the prohibitions laid down by those two provisions if the 
undertaking in question, merely by exercising the special or exclusive rights conferred upon it, 
is led to abuse its dominant position or where such rights are liable to create a situation in which 
that undertaking is led to commit such abuses (Höfner and Elser, cited above, paragraph 29; 
ERT, cited above, paragraph 37; Case C-179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova [1991] 
ECR I-5889, paragraphs 16 and 17; and Case C-323/93 Centre d’insémination de la Crespelle 
[1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 18). In this respect, it is not necessary that any abuse should 
actually occur (see, to that effect, Case C-55/96 Job Centre [1997] ECR I-7119, paragraph 36). 
In any event, Articles [102 TFEU and 106(1) TFEU] are infringed where a measure imputable 
to a Member State, and in particular a measure by which a Member State confers special or 
exclusive rights within the meaning of Article [106(1) TFEU], gives rise to a risk of an abuse 
of a dominant position (see, to that effect, ERT, cited above, paragraph 37; Merci convenzionali 
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porto di Genova, cited above, paragraph 17; and Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR 
I-0000, paragraph 60).90 
The judgment in MOTOE, paragraphs 49 and 50, clearly indicates that the Court will consider 
Article 106(1) in conjunction with Article 102 breached where the dominant position creates 
the mere possibility for an undertaking to commit an abuse. The concept of abuse is interpreted 
broadly, covering ‘a risk of an abuse of a dominant position’. The key question is the discretion 
that a Member State leaves for the regulatory bodies to abuse the conferred powers. Should an 
undertaking be under an obligation to engage in abusive practices, the Member State is to be 
held responsible for such practices, and conversely, if an undertaking has discretion not to abuse 
its special powers the Member State will not be held responsible for the committed abuses.91  
This is reminiscent of the approach to oligopolistic markets and even to a substantive 
assessment of concentrations than to the well-established approach to Article 102 TFEU under 
which abuse has to take place in order to find violation. On the facts of the case, ELPA was the 
sole organizer of motorcycling events and, in addition, was in charge of giving consent to other 
undertakings to organise and commercially exploit motorcycling events. Such powers granted 
to ELPA an apparent advantageous position over its competitors, whereby it could restrict 
access to the relevant market for all other operators.92 
The final word of the Court was that:  
[...] a rule, which gives a legal person such as ELPA the power to give consent to 
applications for authorisation to organise motorcycling events without that power being 
made subject by that rule to restrictions, obligations and review, could lead the legal 
person entrusted with giving that consent to distort competition by favouring events 
which it organises or those in whose organisation it participates. […].93 
Although paragraphs 49 and 50 considered the mere existence of a conflict of interest in breach 
of Article 106(1) in conjunction with 102, this breach could have been avoided if the power 
granted to ELPA were subject to an appropriate standard of control. In this case there was no 
such control mechanism upon ELPA’s activities and Greece lost the case. Nevertheless, as 
concerns the more general principle derived from the MOTOE judgment, a justification for the 
inevitable abuse could be found. Miettinen concluded that, ‘as a consequence of MOTOE, it 
could be argued that since all undertakings that are endowed with regulatory powers are placed 
in a dominant position, regardless of whether they abuse that position they must be subject to 
‘restrictions, obligations and review.’’94 
 
Much like MOTOE, FIA was a case of sporting ‘conflict of interest’ examined under the TFEU 
competition rules. In both cases the central issue was the conflation of regulatory and 
commercial functions in one body, which ultimately led to the blocking of competing 
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organisations and preventing market access. Both cases involved sporting bodies which abused 
organisational rules to protect their private interests rather than acting on behalf of public 
interests. None of the cases involved the specificity of sport in any form. Unlike MOTOE, in 
FIA there was no element of state involvement, as the powers delegated stemmed not from an 
act of a public authority, but from its own rules and a web of private agreements. Whereas in 
MOTOE the requirement on the Member State was to create a system of safeguards against 
abuse (by ELPA’s refusal to grant the consent necessary for the issuance of license) of the 
dominant position it enabled, in FIA the mere fact that the body was issuing licenses was not a 
problem. Rather, it was the restrictions on competition that those licenses entailed under the 
disputed rules.95 The safeguard against an unjustified refusal of licenses as in the FIA case was 
the obligation to insert a new clause ensuring that a legal recourse against FIA’s decisions 
would be available not only within their organizational structure, but also before national courts.  
 
6. Commission decisions in Mouscron [1999] and ENIC [2002] 
 
Several years prior to the seminal Meca-Medina judgement, in ENIC96 and in the unpublished 
Mouscron decision97 the Commission directly applied paragraph 97 of Wouters in its positive 
assessment of the UEFA rule on multi-club ownership and the ‘home and away rule’, 
respectively.  
In Mouscron, the organisation of a sport on a territorial basis was brought into question. The 
UEFA ‘home and away rule’, according to which each club must play its home matches at its 
own ground, was challenged on the basis of Article 102 by the French Communauté Urbaine 
de Lille after UEFA refused to allow the Belgian club Excelsior Mouscron to play its home 
match against the French club Metz in Lille. The Commission rejected the complaint; it 
considered the rule indispensable for the organisation of national and international competitions 
in view of ensuring equality of chances between clubs. Furthermore, the rule was also found to 
be proportionate. 
In ENIC ethical considerations on multi-club ownership prevented the Commission to find the 
rule restrictive under competition law and, instead, it was considered ‘inherent’. Specifically, 
the rule stated that no two or more clubs participating in a UEFA club competition may be 
directly or indirectly controlled by the same entity or managed by the same person. According 
to the Commission the rule was designed to ‘ensure the uncertainty of the outcome and to 
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guarantee that the consumer has the perception that the games played represent honest sporting 
competitions […]’.98 Additionally, the public’s perception of integrity is an essential 
precondition to keep the consumer’s confidence and interest, as well as marketability of 
sporting competitions. Otherwise, as an inevitable consequence over time, ‘[c]lubs would be 
less capable of extracting value from ancillary activities and investment in clubs would lose 
value’.99 The rule was held proportionate, since it did not prevent capital investment in football 
clubs, but merely prohibited more than one club with the same ownership, management or 
control from participating in the same UEFA competition.100 
 
7. C-519/04 Meca-Medina [2006]: the ultimate test for regulatory rules in sport 
 
All judgements of the CJEU prior to and after Meca-Medina that dealt with organisational rules 
in sport were taken solely under provisions on freedom of movement of workers and services. 
The first time that the Court directly addressed the application of competition provisions to 
regulatory rules in sport was in the Meca-Medina judgment of 2006. This decision confirmed 
the applicability of the analytical structure developed in Wouters to regulatory rules in sport. 
For this reason, the case deserves special attention.  
 
7.1 Factual background 
 
The case involved two professional swimmers who were found to have breached the sport’s 
anti-doping rules adopted by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). They tested positive 
for nandrolone and were suspended for a period of four years by the Doping Panel of the 
International Swimming Federation that implemented the rules for their discipline.101 
Contesting the anti-doping rules, the applicants asserted that they were in breach of Articles 
101 and 102, and Article 56 on freedom to provide services:  
[…] First of all, the fixing of the limit at 2 ng/ml is a concerted practice between the 
IOC and the 27 laboratories accredited by it. That limit is scientifically unfounded and 
can lead to the exclusion of innocent or merely negligent athletes. In the applicants’ 
case, the excesses could have been the result of the consumption of a meal containing 
boar meat. Also, the IOC’s adoption of a mechanism of strict liability and the 
establishment of tribunals responsible for the settlement of sports disputes by arbitration 
(the CAS and the ICAS) which are insufficiently independent of the IOC strengthens 
the anti-competitive nature of that limit. […].102 
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7.2 Judgment of the Court: scope of the Treaty 
 
As a starting point the Court reiterated the principles developed in its previous case law. The 
orthodox rule that originated in paragraph 4 of Walrave provides that ‘sport is subject to 
Community law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity […]’.103 Rules of ‘purely 
sporting’ interest having nothing to do with economic activity are excluded from the scope of 
the Treaty.104 The Court cited paragraphs 14 and 15 of Donà and held that freedom of movement 
provisions ‘do not preclude rules or practices justified on non-economic grounds which relate 
to the particular nature and context of certain sporting events,’ and are limited to their proper 
objective.105 Such a restriction on the scope of the freedom of movement provisions ‘cannot be 
relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity from the scope of the Treaty’.106 This 
was established in identical language 11 years before Meca-Medina by the Court’s answer to 
the arguments raised by the German Government in Bosman that sport such as football is not 
an economic activity, that it is akin to culture and should be treated as such, and to UEFA’s 
arguments in that case calling for an exception due to the particular nature of sport. The Court 
said it was addressing ‘the question of application of Article [45 TFEU] to rules laid down by 
sporting associations’ that UEFA and German government were contesting.107  
In Meca-Medina and Bosman the Court stated the obvious: the sporting activity in question and 
sport regulations cannot altogether be excluded from the scope of the Treaty. The restriction on 
the scope of the Treaty concerning the rules that fulfilled the requirements for the exception 
introduced in Walrave and Donà cannot be relied on to argue that the sporting activity governed 
by those rules falls outside of the scope of the Treaty. There is no such thing as a general 
exception for sports under the Treaty.  
 
In the paragraph 27 of Meca-Medina the Court used the new language that resulted in giving 
that paragraph the false reputation of severely limiting the scope of the purely sporting 
exception that originated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of Walrave. Having set out its position from the 
previous case law, it said that: 
In the light of all these considerations, it is apparent that the mere fact that a rule is 
purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the 
Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has 
laid it down.108 
All the Court does here is re-state what is already clear ‘in the light of the above considerations’: 
if a certain rule is purely sporting, it does not mean that person engaged in the activity governed 
by that rule cannot rely on the Treaty in regard to any other rule that governs that activity, and 
it does not mean that a body that adopted a rule considered purely sporting will be removed 
from the scope of the Treaty in regard to other organisational rules it lays down. In either case, 
the fact that the Court uses the language of ‘it is apparent’ would imply that it does not change 
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anything in regard to the previous case law. Weatherill thought that a possible interpretation of 
the decision in Meca-Medina would hold that the so-called rule of ‘purely sporting interest’, 
originating in Walrave and Koch, has now been eliminated as a basis for immunising sports 
rules which have an economic effect from review under EU law.109 
  
Thereafter, the Court overruled the decision of the General Court by finding an error in the 
interpretation of law. It held that: 
even if those rules do not constitute restrictions on freedom of movement because they 
concern questions of purely sporting interest and, as such, have nothing to do with 
economic activity, that fact means neither that the sporting activity in question 
necessarily falls outside the scope of Articles [101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU] nor that the 
rules do not satisfy the specific requirements of those articles. However, in paragraph 
42 of the contested judgment, the [General Court] held that the fact that purely sporting 
rules may have nothing to do with economic activity, with the result that they do not 
fall within the scope of Articles [45 TFEU] and [56 TFEU], means, also, that they have 
nothing to do with the economic relationships of competition, with the result that they 
also do not fall within the scope of Articles [101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU]. In holding 
that rules could thus be excluded straightaway from the scope of those articles solely on 
the ground that they were regarded as purely sporting with regard to the application of 
Articles [45 TFEU] and [56 TFEU], without any need to determine first whether the 
rules fulfilled the specific requirements of Articles [101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU], as set 
out in paragraph 30 of the present judgment, the [General Court] made an error of law.110 
Therefore, the rules found to be purely sporting for the purpose of freedom of movement 
provisions are not by virtue of that fact also excluded from the assessment under competition 
law provisions. They have to satisfy the requirements of both sets of the Treaty rules separately. 
A generous approach of the General Court to the scope of sporting autonomy was quashed and 
tighter legal requirements for compatibility of the rules of governing bodies with EU law were 
set by the Court. Weatherill saw the overruling of the General Court judgment not as a criticism 
to the convergence thesis, but as the Court pointing out the inadequacy of the General Court 
analysis.111 Indeed, the Court had merely reminded us that the two sets of provisions protect 
different freedoms of action and include different elements and that those differences deserve 
recognition.  
The Court’s position can be explained by reference to the constitutional limitations, and 
presumptions in Article 101 TFEU. Namely, the constitutional limitations on the action of the 
Union institutions operate generally, but their specific influence might be different in different 
substantive Treaty provisions. For example, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity in 
Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) purely internal situations fall outside the 
scope of internal market rules and, therefore, are not under the Union’s competence.112 
Nevertheless, the EU competition rules may apply even if the situation is purely internal, as 
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long as there is a required effect on competition. Similarly, the notion of appreciability delimits 
the respective competences between Member States and the Union with regard to competition 
provisions, but it has no real counterpart in the internal market area. Hence, restrictions on 
competition which do not produce an appreciable effect on trade between Member States are 
not subject to EU law with respect to competition provisions, but it may be examined under the 
free movement articles. Therefore, paragraph 31 of Meca-Medina works in reverse too and the 
Court could have produced equal effect by saying:   
even if those rules do not constitute restrictions on competition because they do not 
produce appreciable (economic) effect on trade between Member States and, as such, 
are not a subject of Union competence under competition provisions, that fact means 
neither that the (sporting or other) activity in question necessarily falls outside the scope 
of the free movement provisions nor that the rules do not satisfy the specific 
requirements of those articles. 
The formalistic application, in which the effect of fundamental Union principles under one 
article could determine the outcome under another would deprive those other Treaty articles of 
their proper function. Thus, the competence to act is generally not transplantable from 
competition to internal market articles and vice versa. Neither specific exceptions, nor general 
constitutionally-based limitations can produce a generic effect of excluding a subject matter of 
the scope of the Treaty articles.  
 
The language in paragraph 31 of Meca-Medina can be further explained by the difference in 
presumptions. With regard to cases that involve the specificity of sport, the internal market does 
not have the equivalent of the hard-core restrictions in Article 101(1) TFEU. In sports cases, 
both directly discriminatory and merely restrictive rules are treated within the same analytical 
framework. However, under Article 101(1), if a rule constitutes a ‘per se’ or hard-core 
restriction by object, it is not open to the parties to argue that it in fact does not amount to a 
restriction and the presumption of a breach of that provision is conclusive, as opposed to 
rebuttable. In that case, a rule that has satisfied all the requirements for the category II exception 
under the free movement provisions cannot benefit from the attempt at that exception under 
Article 101(1) to which it would otherwise be entitled but for the hard-core restrictions and 
conclusive presumptions of the breach. A party may rely on Article 101(3), but not on any of 
the judicially-developed exceptions available for ancillary restraints analysis under Article 101 
(1) TFEU. Conversely, if there is no conclusive presumption under the competition provisions 
and the rule has already been regarded under internal market articles as ‘purely sporting’, this 
interpretation can be transposed to competition law cases with no further analysis required. The 
paragraph 31 in Meca-Medina should be read in this light. Once there is a rebuttable 
presumption under EU competition law articles and the ‘required economic effect’ is 
established under both sets of provisions, all other conditions for an exception are the same.113 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 Pijetlovic 2015, pp 222-223. 
  
7.3 Judgment of the Court: the test  
 
Finally, the Court directed its attention to the application of Article 101(1) TFEU. Relying on 
its previous ruling in Wouters, the Court emphasised the need for a contextual approach: 
Not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of 
undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them 
necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article [101(1) TFEU]. For the 
purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be 
taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings was 
taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be 
considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in 
the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others, paragraph 97) and are proportionate 
to them.114 
The fact that the doping rule was intended to safeguard the objective of fair play and ethics in 
sports did not exclude it from the scope of competition rules; the economic effects that it 
produced had to be considered in the light of the Wouters inherency test and the requirement of 
proportionality. The rule was found to restrict athletes’ freedom of action, but to the extent that 
the general objective was to provide a level playing field and preserve integrity of sporting 
competition and the sanctions were necessary to ensure compliance with the doping ban, the 
restrictions were deemed inherent. The Court also found that athletes did not demonstrate that 
the controversial rule was disproportionate and upheld the previous finding of the Commission 
on this point. 
So the athletes lost. Of particular importance is that they did not lose because the rules were of 
‘purely sporting’ interest, but because these rules satisfied the test laid down by the Court in 
paragraph 42.115 
According to that test, an organisational sporting rule or practice that is found to restrict the 
freedom of action under Article 101(1) or 102 may not breach those provisions to the extent 
that the rule in question pursues a legitimate objective, its restrictive effects are inherent in the 
pursuit of that objective and are proportionate to it. The process of assessing the compatibility 
of the rules under the internal market objective justification test, therefore, involves essentially 
the same analytical points as the test under paragraph 42 of Meca-Medina. 
In Meca-Medina, just as in Wouters, the Court applied a moderate intensity proportionality 
test.116 This intensity would usually vary depending on the restriction in question. It does not 
follow from Meca-Medina that the Court has given any special consideration to sport in this 
regard. 
 
7.4 Final remarks 
 
The Meca-Medina judgment hit closer to the core of sporting autonomy than any other 
judgment prior to it. Needless to say, it was not welcomed by the sporting bodies. In particular, 
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the IOC and the two largest football governing bodies (FIFA and UEFA) considered it as an 
attack on their authority and an unnecessary intrusion into the scope of their sporting autonomy. 
UEFA’s Director of Legal Affairs commented on the judgment in Meca-Medina saying that it 
has opened up a possibility for almost any sports sanction for any offence (e.g. doping, match-
fixing, gambling, bad conduct, etc.) to be described as representing a condition ‘for engaging 
in’ sporting activity and be challenged under EU competition law.117 However, the fact that 
sporting rules would be scrutinised under the competition provisions does not mean that they 
are necessarily found in breach of those provisions. Justified and proportionate rules withstand 
any legal challenge. But the concerns of the sporting bodies seem to disregard of this fact. Meca-
Medina has opened a door for new possibilities to challenge most of the organisational sport 
rules and could arguably lead to a substantial increase in litigation. 
 
8. Annex I framework for analysis of organisational rules in sport 
 
8.1 General structure 
This general framework is set out in the 2007 Commission Staff Paper, Annex I entitled Sport 
and EU Competition Rules. In paragraph 2.1.2 of Annex I the Commission divided the approach 
to organisational rules in sport into four distinct steps. Step 1 includes an enquiry on the nature 
of the body that adopted the rule, for instance, whether the sports association that adopted the 
rule is to be considered an undertaking or an association of undertakings. As explained below 
in Annex I, these may include individual athletes, sport clubs and national and international 
sporting associations. Whereas this step essentially comprises an applicability test, Step 2 
contains the regulatory ancillarity test and raises the question on the existence of restrictions on 
competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU and/or an abuse of a dominant position 
under Article 102 TFEU. The answer to this question depends on the outcome of the Meca-
Medina/Wouters test. The rule or practice adopted by an undertaking or association of 
undertakings which is found to satisfy the cumulative criteria of the Meca-Medina/Wouters test 
is considered compatible with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Should the rule or practice fail to 
meet any of the criteria, it would breach Article 101(1) and/or would constitute an abuse 
contrary to Article 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, another condition has to be satisfied to finally 
reach this conclusion: Step 3 refers to the requirement that any restriction or abuse, if found, 
must have an appreciable effect on trade between Member States in order to breach EU 
competition rules. Step 4 represents the exemption stage of analysis. It is a final, but relatively 
insubstantial, lifeline for a restrictive or abusive sporting rule with an appreciable effect on 
intra-Union trade. It examines whether a restrictive rule fulfils the conditions of Article 101(3) 
TFEU or the equivalent economic efficiency test under Article 102 TFEU as described above 
in Section 4.1. It must be acknowledged that it is highly unlikely that a rule of a sporting 
organisation pursuing a non-competition goal that cannot be translated into economic 
efficiencies or a rule that has failed the Meca-Medina/Wouters test on the point of 
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proportionality would satisfy the requisite economic conditions.118 That outlines yet another 
raison d’être of the Wouters test in the sporting context, for without it, the broad scope of 
Article 101(1) would most likely render virtually any organisational rule of sport that restricts 
the freedom of action and relies on the non-competition justification incompatible with the 
entire Article 101 TFEU. 
 
8.2 Organisational rules not likely to infringe Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
In Annex I the EU Commission, as a matter of general guidance, provided a list of examples of 
rules likely not to infringe the competition articles. Due to a very high degree of convergence 
between internal market and competition law analytical structures and their respective identical 
outcomes with regard to the legality of rules, the list was partly generated from internal market 
case law. Annex I specifies that the legitimate objectives of sporting rules would normally relate 
to the ‘organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport’.119 The following types of rules 
constitute examples of organisational sporting rules that, based on their legitimate objectives, 
are unlikely to violate competition law, provided that the restrictions contained in such rules 
are inherent and proportionate to the objectives pursued: 
▪ Rules of the game (e.g., the rules fixing the length of matches or the number of players on the 
field) typically do not have any economic effect and would fall under paragraph 4 of Walrave; 
▪ Rules concerning selection criteria for sport competitions, such as in Deliège discussed above 
in Section 2.3 in internal market context, would produce identical results under competition 
provisions due to the virtually identical test;  
▪ ‘At home and away from home’ rules such as in Mouscron decision (discussed above in 
Section 6); 
▪ Rules preventing multiple ownership in club competitions such as in ENIC, discussed above 
in Section 6;  
▪ Rules concerning the composition of national teams, such as in Walrave case (discussed above 
in Section 2.1); 
▪ Anti-doping rules such as in Meca-Medina case (discussed above in Section 7); 
▪ Rules concerning transfer periods, also referred to as ‘transfer windows’, such as in Lehtonen 
case (discussed above in Section 2.2) and; 
▪ Licensing systems for sport clubs/teams in professional league competitions are also likely to 
satisfy the Meca-Medina/Wouters test. Such rules are intended to ensure the financial stability 
of clubs/teams (and, thus, the regularity of sport competitions) and the availability of proper 
and safe sport facilities. These rules are considered inherent in and necessary for the 
organisation of sport, but the proportionality will be carefully reviewed where they may 
interfere with business decisions of clubs/teams. The break-even requirement in UEFA’s Club 
Licencing and Financial Fair Play Regulations is currently facing a legal challenge before the 
CJEU in the Striani case.120 
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8.3 Organisational rules that may infringe Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
 
The Commission also composed a list of rules with a higher likelihood of causing problems 
concerning compliance with competition law; nonetheless, it added that some of them could be 
justified under certain conditions of Article 101(3) or Article 102 TFEU. It must be emphasised 
that some of the rules mentioned in this category are capable of passing the Meca-
Medina/Wouters assessment: 
 
▪ Rules protecting sports associations from competition have been evaluated for their 
compatibility with EU competition law in the FIA case and in the Court’s MOTOE case, 
discussed above in Section 5. Motor sports, especially Formula One, are more akin to business 
than to sport.121 The restrictive organisational rules in those cases were intended to protect 
private commercial interests. There are, however, some other sports governing bodies that 
prohibit the formation of alternative leagues by the member clubs or condition the entry to the 
organisational market upon fulfilment of certain criteria, but that might be justifiable on the 
basis of public interest objectives. Such clauses may pass Meca-Medina/Wouters and the 
internal market objective justification tests, but will be subject to a strict proportionality 
analysis. An example of such a rule is Article 49 of UEFA Statutes that can be justified on the 
basis of solidarity mechanisms that enable the fulfilment of the socio-cultural functions of 
football and work to preserve a certain financial and sporting balance between clubs and an 
effective and proper organisation of sport. Elsewhere I argued that certain UEFA conditions 
implementing Article 49 of its Statutes would have to be amended to pass the proportionality 
test.122  
 
▪ Rules excluding legal challenges of decisions by sports associations before national courts. 
The denial of access to ordinary courts, which may facilitate anti-competitive agreements or 
conduct was addressed in the FIA case, discussed above in Section 5 and in the FIFA case. One 
of the Commission’s objections in FIA related to the lack of possibility to challenge FIA 
decisions outside the FIA structure. FIA was forced to insert a new clause clarifying that anyone 
subject to its decisions can challenge them before national courts as a safeguard against 
unjustified refusals of licenses. Similarly, throughout negotiations with FIFA on transfer rules 
in case of valid contracts, the Commission insisted that arbitration would be voluntary and 
would not prevent recourse to national courts, which led to FIFA modifying its transfer rules to 
this end.123 Sporting associations usually do have arbitration clauses in their commitment 
agreements with players. Some of them contain clauses that facilitate anti-competitive 
practices, such as the ones imposed by tennis governing bodies.124 
 
                                                 
http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/the-brussels-court-judgment-on-financial-fair-play-a-futile-attempt-to-
pull-off-a-bosman-by-ben-van-rompuy#_ftnref5. Accessed 10 July 2015. 
121 Cygan 2007, p 76. 
122 Pijetlovic 2015, pp 290-301. 
123 Commission, Staff Working Document, para 2.2.2.2; See also Report from the Commission - XXXIst Report 
on Competition Policy 2001, SEC/2002/0462 final, para 220. 
124 Pijetlovic 2013, pp 161-186.  
  
▪ Rules concerning nationality clauses for sport clubs/teams, such as quota requirements in 
Bosman. Today it is clear that these directly discriminatory rules will infringe free movement 
provisions and, therefore, any economic justifications they could produce under the economic 
efficiency defence will not have an effect on their illegality under internal market provisions. 
Whereas the rules challenged under both internal market and competition law must pass both 
tests to be considered legal, it is sufficient that they violate only one set of provisions to be 
considered void and unenforceable. On the other hand, indirectly discriminatory rules, such as 
UEFA’s home-grown players rule, might be able to satisfy the internal market objective 
justification criteria and, therefore, survive the Meca-Medina/Wouters test.125 
 
▪ Rules regulating the transfer of athletes between clubs (except transfer windows), such as 
transfer fees in Bosman discussed above in Section 2.2, also belong to the more problematic 
category of organisational rules. However, some of these rules are capable of satisfying Meca-
Medina/Wouters test as we saw in Bernard, a case that concerned compensation fees for young 
players. Bosman did not address the legality of transfer fees for players who are still under 
contract. In 1998 the Commission issued a statement of objections concerning FIFA’s 
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, but closed the investigation in 2002 
following FIFA’s commitments to modify its transfer rules for in-contract players.126 The main 
commitments were inclusions of certain measures to support the training of players (e.g. 
training compensation for young players and a solidarity mechanism), establishing a transfer 
period per season, specification of contractual arrangements between players and clubs (e.g. 
regulating duration of contracts, and specifying when breaches of contracts are possible, 
including sanctions), and ensuring that arbitration is voluntary and does not prevent recourse to 
national courts in case of disputes. 
 
▪ Rules regulating professions ancillary to sport were assessed under EU competition law in 
the Piau case in the context of the activity of players’ agents. The General Court considered it 
an economic activity involving the provision of services which does not fall within the scope 
of the specific nature of sport.127 In order to acquire a licence, players’ agents were required to 
have impeccable reputation, pass a written examination and take out professional liability 
insurance policy or deposit a bank guarantee. This constituted a barrier to access to that 
economic activity. However, because (1) the contested FIFA rules sought to protect players and 
their short careers for incompetent representation in transfer negotiations by raising 
professional and ethical standards for the occupation, (2) the compulsory license system did not 
eliminate the effective competition and it is based on qualitative rather than quantitative 
selection criteria appropriate for the attainment of the first objective, and (3) there existed no 
collective organisation of players’ agent and no generalised national rules, the restrictions on 
competition brought about by the compulsory licence system could enjoy an exemption 
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decision under Article 101(3) TFEU.128 It followed from these considerations that an abuse of 
a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU could also not be established.129  
In 2009 the Commission funded an independent study on sport agents. The main concerns 
identified were of an ethical nature, including financial crime and exploitation of young 
players.130 
 
8.4  Comment 
Both of the lists in Annex I are non-exhaustive and were composed exclusively on the basis of 
existing case-law. Even though there is a lot of fluidity, it can be concluded that the overall 
difference between the lists is whether the organisational rule protects public or private 
interests, and whether the specific nature of sport is involved. We saw in Piau that even where 
the rules protected public interests, but were not connected to the notion of the specificity of 
sport, the General Court did not refer to the possibility of regulatory ancillarity, but simply 
concluded that restrictions existed. Protecting private interests, the lack of connection to the 
specific nature of sport or direct discrimination (other than the purely sporting rules within the 
meaning of paragraphs 14 and 15 of Donà), will eliminate the possibility of passing Meca-
Medina/Wouters test. As a matter of law, such rules may nevertheless benefit from commercial 
ancillarity or the Article 101(3) exemption and the equivalent defences under Article 102 
TFEU. It would not influence the outcome if the claimant also brought action under internal 
market provisions.   
Some important outstanding issues that have not been subject to either a Commission or a 
Court’s decision are uncompensated player release rules, salary caps and the home-grown 
players rule. The Commission pays due caution to the fact that regardless of the tentative 
classification of items on the two lists, an individual analysis of every challenged organisational 
sporting rule on a case-by-case basis is indispensable. In its Communication on Sport the 
Commission further emphasises that through dialogue with sports stakeholders it will continue 
its efforts to explain on a theme-per-theme basis the relation between EU law and sporting 
rules.131 The sports governing bodies nonetheless need to be careful not to take the 
Commission’s opinion as a final say on the legality of their rules. The fact that a rule is drafted 
in collaboration with the Commission does not shield it from judicial scrutiny or provide any 
guarantees as to its compatibility with EU law. The Commission does not have the power to 
authorise rules and practices that are contrary to the Treaty. 
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